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ABSTRACT 
 
Financial Consequences of III Health and Informal Coping 
Mechanisms in Indonesia 
 
Robert Sparrow (Australian National University), Ellen Van de Poel (Erasmus 
University Rotterdam), Gracia Hadiwidjaja, Athia Yumna, Nila Warda, Asep 
Suryahadi (The SMERU Research Institute) 
 
 
We assess the financial risk of ill health for households in Indonesia, the role of informal 
coping strategies, and the effectiveness of these strategies in smoothing consumption. 
Based on household panel data, we find evidence of financial risk from illness through 
medical expenses, while income from informal wage labor  is exposed to risk for the poor 
and income from self-employed business activities for the non-poor. However, only for the 
rural population and the poor does this lead to imperfect consumption smoothing, while 
the non-poor seem to be able to protect current spending. 
 
Borrowing and drawing on buffers, such as savings and assets, seem to be key informal 
coping strategies for the poor, which infers potential negative long term effects. While 
these results suggest scope for public intervention, the financial risk from income loss for 
the rural poor is beyond public health care financing reforms. Rather, formal sector 
employment seems to be a key instrument for financial protection from illness, by also 
reducing income risk. 
 
Key words: Illness, income, consumption smoothing, coping strategies, Indonesia 
JEL: O15, I15 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Indonesia has recently formulated ambitious objectives for health care financing reforms, 
which focus largely on social risk management, in terms of reducing financial risk from ill 
health and seeking health care. Following initial reforms in 2005, with the introduction of 
subsidized social health insurance for informal sector workers and the poor, the current 
policy debate is concentrated on scaling up to universal health insurance and aligning 
existing social health insurance programs and subnational health care financing policies. 
 
Nevertheless, questions remain regarding the extent and nature of financial risk from ill 
health. For example, what financial risk from illness do households face, and what are the 
main sources of this risk (e.g., medical expenses, income loss)? What are the main 
(informal) coping strategies employed by households, and to what extent do these 
strategies allow households to deal with the financial consequences of illness. Mapping 
these transmission channels and understanding coping behavior are important for 
identifying the scope for public intervention, and for tailoring social policy responses to the 
main sources of financial risk of ill health. 
 
Empirical evidence for developing countries generally finds that households are 
constrained in their ability to insure against ill health and only partly able to smooth 
consumption, in particular in the event of large infrequent high cost shocks and chronic 
illness (e.g., Townsend, 1994; Gertler and Gruber, 2002; Asfaw and Braun, 2004; 
Wagstaff, 2007; Gertler, Levine, and Moretti, 2009; Nguyen and Mangyo, 2010). 
However, these studies remain predominantly reduced form analyses, and fail to pin 
down the transmission channels through which health shocks affect household living 
standards. Most studies identify medical spending as one source of risk, while there is 
limited evidence of income loss due to illness (e.g., Kochar, 1995; Lindelow and 
Wagstaff, 2005; Wagstaff, 2007). For Indonesia, Gertler and Gruber (2002) show that 
earnings by heads of households are affected as a result of major illness. In addition, little 
is known of the role of coping mechanisms that households employ to self-insure against 
ill health, and the relative financial contributions from these strategies. Gertler, Levine, 
and Moretti (2009) investigate the role of formal coping mechanisms, finding that living 
near a microfinance institute increases Indonesian households’ ability to smooth 
consumption when faced with medical expenses and income loss due to illness. Islam and 
Maitra (2011) find similar results in Bangladesh. 
 
This paper aims to address some of these gaps in the empirical evidence. We first assess the 
distribution of self-reported ill health in Indonesia and whether households are able to 
smooth consumption. In line with earlier studies for Indonesia, we find evidence of 
imperfect consumption smoothing, in particular for poor and rural households. We then 
identify the main sources of financial risk of ill health, such as out-of-pocket (OOP) 
spending on health care and reduced household income through forgone earnings, using 
detailed information on type of income source (wage labor, agriculture self-employed, non-
agricultural self-employed, and transfers and remittances) for different socioeconomic 
groups. Finally, we assess the informal coping strategies invoked by households to deal 
with ill-health related costs (such as borrowing, selling assets, and relying on family 
networks), and the effectiveness of these strategies in smoothing consumption. 
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II. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
 
2.1 Smoothing and Financial Risk of Illness 
 
We apply a general framework of consumption smoothing, which is displayed in Figure 1. 
Households that experience illness are faced with subsequent sources of financial risk: 
required medical expenses (2A), indirect cost of seeking treatment (2B) and reduced 
income (2C). With imperfect financial markets, households may invoke (informal) coping 
strategies (3) to deal with these risks, and the choice of strategy will have consequences for 
consumption and poverty (4). For example, financing from disposable income may reduce 
current consumption, possibly leading to transient (food) poverty. Alternatively, 
households may resort to traditional coping strategies such as selling assets or incurring 
debt, which may affect future income. Finally, household may decide to forgo treatment, at 
the cost of depreciating their human capital. 
 
 
Figure 1. Consumption smoothing, channels of financial risk of illness and 
the role of coping strategies 
 
In our empirical analysis we aim to identify a number of these relationships: 
A. Reduced form relationship between ill health and household expenditure (1 → 4). 
B. Main sources of risk (1 → 2A and 2C). 
C. Coping mechanisms induced by ill health (1 → 3). 
D. The mitigating effects of coping mechanisms (3 → 4, in case of ill health). 
 
 
2.2 Methods 
 
To assess the effect of ill health on consumption (relation A), and income and medical 
expenses (relation B), we use Generalized Linear Models (GLM), which are well suited to 
deal with skewed outcomes and avoid retransformation problems (Mihaylova et al., 2011; 
Buntin and Zaslavsky, 2004; Manning and Mullahy, 2001). Let yit represent the income of 
household i at time t = 2003, 2004. This, and each of the other expenditure/income 
variables, is assumed to be generated as follows: 
1
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Poverty
Long term effects
‐Assets
‐Human capital
2.B
Indirect
costs
2.A
Medical
costs
3
Coping
strategies
The SMERU Research Institute 3
( ){ } FyxhyEg ititititit ~,αθβγ +++=      (1) 
 
With g(.) representing the link function and F(.) the distributional family of the GLM. The 
model includes a variable indicating that a household experienced illness in period t (hit), a 
time effect (θt) which captures the trend in income common across all households, a full set 
of household fixed effects (αi) which absorb time invariant differences, and an array of time 
varying household characteristics (xit). 
 
In these models we assume a log link and Poisson family such that (1) is a fixed effects 
Poisson model (FEP), and calculate robust standard errors. This model has the advantage 
of being easily estimated, and while Poisson models are typically used for count data, they 
do not require the variable of interest to follow a Poisson distribution. In fact, all that is 
needed for the FEP estimator to be consistent is that the conditional mean is correctly 
specified (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Wooldridge, 2002).1 As such, the FEP is a 
useful and very robust estimator in the context of panel data on skewed and censored 
outcomes, such as health and other spending. 
 
To establish the coping strategies that households are most likely to use in response to ill 
health (relation C), we assume an identity link and Gaussian family such that (1) is a linear 
probability model with household fixed effects.2 These models are estimated separately for 
each of the (binary) coping strategies and only on the sample of households who 
experienced illness or other shocks in the respective survey year. 
 
Finally, to identify the effect of coping strategies on households’ incomes and expenditures 
in the event of ill health (relation D), we add a full set of indicator variables of coping 
strategies to model (1) (with log link and Poisson family) and limit the sample to those 
households that experienced at least one ill health event over the two survey waves. 
 
A key empirical challenge is to deal with the potential endogenous nature of self-reported 
ill health with respect to household income and consumption. In particular, unobserved 
heterogeneity in preferences and latent health status may threaten internal validity. To a 
large extent this unobserved heterogeneity will be eliminated by means of household fixed 
effects. In addition, changes in demographic, education and housing characteristics of 
households should capture important time variant confounders. 
 
 
2.3 Data 
 
The study draws on the nationally representative Indonesian Socioeconomic survey 
(Susenas), which was conducted for a household panel in 2002, 2003, and 2004.  In 2003 
and 2004, the survey includes special modules on household expenditure, income, self-
reported threats to household welfare, and strategies households used to cope with these 
threats. The questions on self-reported threats ask whether the welfare of the household 
                                                            
1The FEP is optimal when the conditional variance is proportional (not equal) to the conditional mean, but 
also consistent when this is not the case. 
2We assessed the robustness of results to using a conditional logit (available upon request). While the result of 
family assistance being the most frequent coping strategy is confirmed, some results differ. We do prefer results 
from a linear probability model, as the conditional logit uses only those observations for which the dependent 
variable varies over time, which drastically reduces sample size. 
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has been affected during the last year by an event related to illness, natural disasters, loss of 
employment or pension, conflict, divorce, theft, business risk, or government policies.3 
 
The ill health events may reflect unexpected health shocks, but also lasting conditions and 
chronic illness that may affect household welfare. In the remainder of the paper we will 
therefore refer to ill health events, rather than health shocks. The coping responses are not 
directly linked to specific events. Rather, when a household reports one or more events, 
they are asked what kind of coping strategies were employed in response to any event. 
Descriptive statistics of the various events that affected household welfare and coping 
variables are given in Table 1. Besides illness, we include the other self-reported events as 
control variables in all regressions. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Prevalence of Various Threats Affecting 
Household Welfare and Associated Coping Strategies 
  2003 2004 Total Sample 
  
mean mean Concentration 
Index 
Std. error
Self-reported threats (1/0)     
Health 0.079 0.065 -0.019 0.003 
Natural Disaster 0.088 0.056 -0.036 0.003 
Loss of job or pension 0.029 0.026 0.010 0.010 
Conflict, divorce or theft 0.018 0.018 -0.006 0.008 
Business risk 0.223 0.174 -0.144 0.005 
Government policies 0.580 0.348 -0.053 0.005 
Other shocks 0.227 0.367 0.015 0.009 
Self-reported coping strategies (1/0)     
Use saving 0.115 0.085   
Borrow money 0.223 0.179   
Sell assets 0.084 0.067   
Ask (extended) family to help 0.170 0.146   
Increase labor 0.108 0.075   
Reduce consumption 0.183 0.118   
Other 0.184 0.156   
Observations 7724 7724   
Note: Coping strategies are not mutually exclusive. Corrected concentration indices are calculated as suggested by 
Erreygers (2009) to account for the binary nature of the dependent variables. 
 
The detailed household spending data is aggregated to three categories: food, non-food 
and OOP health spending. Household income is categorized by wages, agriculture self-
employed, non-agriculture self-employed and remittances.4 Per capita household  
  
                                                            
3The exact phrasing of the question reads “During the past year, did the household experience events that 
negatively affected the household’s welfare?” (“Selama setahun terakhir, apakah rumah tangga mengalami kejadian 
yang berdampak negatif terhadap kesejahteraan rumah tangga Anda?”). 
4The Susenas survey also reports income from capital gains, interest and rent, but these unearned sources of 
income are not considered in our analysis. 
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expenditure is used as welfare indicator for ranking households by quartile, as this 
provides a more accurate reflection of wealth and purchasing power than annual 
income. We define per capita expenditure quintiles based on 2002 spending, since these 
are exogenous to self-reported ill health in 2003 and 2004, unlike the 2003 and 2004 
consumption quartiles. Expenditure and income are given in Table 2, expressed in 2002 
prices and adjusted for regional price differences, using regional variation in poverty 
lines. All models further include a vector of household characteristics related to 
demographics (household size, female head of household), education of the head of 
household, dwelling characteristics (walls of bamboo, a floor made of earth, floor area, 
private toilet, a closed sewer, electricity connection, access to clean drinking water, and 
direct access to a private or public water facility) and insurance status (see Table 3). The 
latter is captured by indicators for enrollment in social health insurance for the public 
(Askes) and private sector (Jamsostek), a targeted fee waiver program for the poor, and 
other insurance programs that are recorded in the survey. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Household Expenditures and Income 
  2003 2004
  Mean Std. error  Mean Std. error 
Expenditure     
Food spending 150,827 79,380 144,855 76,601 
Non-food spending (excl. OOP health) 109,133 139,488 113,536 152,513 
OOP health spending 4,749 15,824 5,706 21,841 
Income     
Salary and wage income 118,983 234,206 122,327 230,586 
Agricultural Income 61,049 104,347 56,997 101,056 
Non-agricultural Income 84,642 265,517 87,381 321,032 
Remittance and transfers 34,974 121,934 37,888 126,606 
Note: All spending and income variables are expressed in Indonesian rupiah, in per capita terms, in 2002 prices and 
adjusted for regional price differences, using regional variation in poverty lines. 
 
These health financing programs are important determinants of financial risk and coping 
strategies in response to ill health, but also likely to be endogenous to household 
consumption through targeting or self-selection. It is not the objective of this paper to 
evaluate the effects of these health financing programs, which will merely serve as controls. 
We will therefore refrain from interpreting the results for these programs, and assess any 
potential endogeneity bias by means of a sensitivity analysis. We find that the results are 
robust to including these variables.5 
 
We restrict our analysis to the 2003 and 2004 waves of the balanced panel of 7,724 
households. The data shows a substantial rate of attrition, as initially 9,484 households 
were sampled. Based on 2002 characteristics, the balanced panel and the households 
lost due to attrition look fairly similar on average, although there are some differences. 
The subsample of households that dropped out in 2003 and 2004 has a lower rural 
share (51% versus 58% urban share), which is reflected in slightly higher household 
                                                            
5The results are not shown here, but are reported in a supplemental appendix. 
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spending levels, education and living conditions.6 We further test for attrition bias by 
adding an attrition selection term to the consumption smoothing regressions.7 We find 
that the results are not sensitive to including the selection term and the coefficient for 
the selection term is not statistically significant, suggesting that our results are not 
sensitive to attrition bias. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (Means) of Household Characteristics 
 Balanced Panel 
 2003 2004 
Household size (persons) 4.00 4.00 
Female head of household (1/0) 0.13 0.13 
Highest education head of household (1/0)   
No education  0.33 0.34 
Primary schooling  0.32 0.32 
Junior high school  0.12 0.12 
Senior high school 0.17 0.17 
Higher  0.05 0.05 
Health Insurance (1/0)   
Insured through Askes or Jamsostek  0.13 0.14 
Health card 0.11 0.10 
Other insurance 0.05 0.07 
Household owns house (1/0) 0.85 0.85 
Walls made of bamboo (1/0) 0.13 0.12 
House has earth floor (1/0) 0.16 0.14 
Total floor area (m2) 67.98 70.21 
Access to clean drinking water (1/0) 0.34 0.35 
No access to private/public water facilities (1/0) 0.14 0.15 
House has private toilet (1/0) 0.58 0.59 
House has closed sewer (1/0) 0.42 0.44 
Access to electricity (1/0) 0.86 0.86 
Rural (1/0) 0.58 0.58 
Number of observations 7,724 7,724 
 
   
                                                            
6The relatively larger urban share may be due to the higher degree of mobility of urban households, reducing 
the probability of being revisited in 2003 and 2004. The results are given in a supplementary appendix. 
7The selection term is the inverse Mills ratio based on a selection probit where the probability that a 
household remains in the balanced panel is explained by the 2002 values of all the explanatory variables used 
in equation (1). To aid identification, we also add the ID code of the 2002 enumerator, based on the 
hypothesis that the probability of participating in the following survey rounds is partly based on a household’s 
experience in the first survey. We estimate the smoothing equation as an OLS difference regression, where 
the error terms in the selection and smoothing equations are assumed to have a joint normal distribution (see 
the supplementary appendix for details and results). 
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III. RESULT 
 
 
3.1 Patterns in Self-reported Ill Health and Coping Response 
 
On average, 7.9% of the sample reported that household welfare in the previous year was 
affected by ill health in 2003, compared to 6.5% in 2004 (Table 1). The frequency of 
reported ill health events is similar to that of natural disasters (8.8%/5.6 %), but much 
smaller then self-reported income loss due to business risk (22.0%/17.4%) and government 
policies (58.0%/34.8 %). 
 
Self-reported ill health events are more common among the poorer population groups, as 
illustrated by the negative concentration index (CI = -0.02)8. However, it seems that they are 
more equally distributed across the population than income risk from business activities, 
government policies and natural disasters. Conflict, divorce, and theft are fairly equally 
distributed across income levels, while job loss is relatively more frequent among the non-poor. 
 
In general, borrowing is the most prominent coping response, followed by adjusting 
consumption and family assistance (lower panel of Table 1). Drawing on savings, increased 
labor activity, and selling assets are the least frequent coping strategies. 
 
 
3.2 Consumption Smoothing and Coping with Risk 
 
3.2.1 Consumption Smoothing 
 
The reduced form effects of self-reported ill health on food and non-food consumption are 
presented in the first two columns of Table 4. The results suggest imperfect smoothing for 
rural households, with an ill health event reducing non-food spending by 6.6%. These 
negative effects are concentrated with the poorest two quartiles (10.1% and 7.7%, 
respectively), yet only statistically significant for non-food spending of the poorest quartile.  
 
3.3.2 Main Sources of Risk 
 
The main sources of financial risk following ill health are given in the last five columns of Table 
4. OOP health spending seems to be a key source of risk for all wealth quartiles, with an ill 
health event close to doubling health OOP expenditures (and even more than doubling for the 
second and fourth quartile). Non-agricultural income from self-employment is sensitive to ill 
health, with the effect for urban larger than for rural households, but urban households also 
receive more transfers than their rural counterparts.  The results for socioeconomic subgroups 
(row 5-8) reveal that wage income is negatively affected by ill health for the two poorest 
quartiles, yet it is only statistically significant for the second quartile. For these poorest quartiles, 
this may reflect wage income earned predominantly in the informal sector, while the richest 
half of the sample that earns a wage income are more likely to enjoy the relative protection 
from the formal sector. However, for the richest quartile health shocks pose a sizable threat to 
non-agricultural income risk, presumably referring to self-employed business and entrepreneurs. 
 
                                                            
8A concentration index is a rank-based measure of socioeconomic inequality with positive values indicating 
that the variable of interest is more prevalent among the rich and vice versa (Erreygers, 2009; Wagstaff, Paci 
and Van Doorslaer, 1991).  
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Table 4. Effect of Self-reported Ill Health on Per Capita Expenditures (OOP, Food, Non-food) and Income (Wage, Agriculture, Non-
agriculture, Transfer/Remittance) for the Total Sample and by Population Subgroup 
Dependent  
Variable 
Expenditures Income 
Food Non-food 
(excl. OOP) 
OOP Wage Agriculture 
Self-employed 
Non-agriculture 
Self-employed 
Transfers 
Full sample 0.012 -0.015 0.974*** 0.030 -0.066 -0.411*** 0.089 
Urban 0.044 0.02 1.093*** 0.005 0.012 -0.394** 0.266*** 
Rural -0.011 -0.066* 0.868*** 0.062 -0.066 -0.223** -0.027 
Subgroups        
Quartile 1 -0.027 -0.101** 0.713*** -0.153 0.016 0.003 0.142 
Quartile 2 -0.030 -0.077 1.154*** -0.217* -0.069 -0.06 0.211* 
Quartile 3 0.025 0.044 0.817*** 0.118 -0.106 -0.070 -0.108 
Quartile 4 0.046 0.018 1.118*** 0.082 -0.081 -0.614*** 0.168 
Note: Table show coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed effects. Models include covariates as explained in section 2.2, indicator variables for other shocks and a year dummy. 
Quartiles are constructed on the basis of total per capita household expenditures in 2002.  
*significant at 10%.  
** significant at 5%.  
***significant at 1%. 
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Table 5. Effect of Ill Health on the Choice of Coping Strategies 
Dependent 
Variable Use Savings 
Borrow          
Non-collateral 
Sell Assets/ 
Pawned 
Family 
Assistance Increase Labor 
Decrease 
Consumption Other 
Full sample 0.033* 0.153*** 0.086*** 0.215*** 0.042** 0.091*** 0.004 
Urban 0.034 0.203*** 0.145*** 0.222*** 0.103*** 0.116*** 0.014 
Rural 0.040** 0.118*** 0.056*** 0.221*** 0.003 0.076*** 0.001 
Subgroups        
Quartile 1 0.047** 0.211*** 0.111*** 0.309*** 0.057* 0.166*** 0.000 
Quartile 2 0.054* 0.090** 0.116*** 0.179*** 0.049 0.104*** 0.071* 
Quartile 3 0.013 0.178*** 0.025 0.145*** -0.030 0.029 0.012 
Quartile 4 -0.006 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.209*** 0.074** 0.053 -0.071 
Notes: Coefficient from linear regressions with household fixed effects. Models include covariates as explained in section 2.2, indicator variables for other shocks and a year dummy.  Quartiles are 
constructed on the basis of total per capita household expenditures in 2002.  
*significant at 10%.  
**significant at 5%.  
***significant at 1%. 
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3.2.3 Coping Mechanisms Induced by Health Shocks 
 
Coping responses to self-reported ill health are given in Table 5, where the coefficients reflect the 
percentage point increase in the probability of using a particular coping mechanism in response to ill 
health that is affecting income. The most commonly used strategies are to rely on family assistance 
and to borrow (marginal effects of respectively 0.21 and 0.15), as already suggested by the summary 
statistics in Table 1. This is followed by decreasing consumption and selling assets. Urban households 
are more likely to borrow and sell assets, but less likely to use savings as compared to rural 
households. This could indicate that credit markets in urban areas function better and are more 
accessible than in rural areas. Poor households are more likely to reduce current consumption and 
deplete buffers such as savings, compared to those in the upper quartiles. Relying on family 
networks, borrowing and selling assets are common strategies across all wealth levels. 
 
3.2.4 The Mitigating Effects of Coping Mechanisms  
 
Having established the most frequently used coping strategies, we investigate which strategies are 
offering the most financial protection (in the short term). Table 6 shows the effects of coping 
mechanisms on OOP health spending and consumption smoothing for households in the poorest 
quartile that report to have experienced an ill health event in either 2003 or 2004. The results 
suggest that first borrowing and then selling assets are the most effective responses for financing 
health care (increasing OOP spending by 59% and 45%, respectively) while savings and incurring 
debt are used for consumption smoothing. While family assistance is the most common response 
to a health shock, it seems to have little effect on reducing financial risk for the poor.  
 
Table 6. Effect of Coping Mechanisms on Per Capita Expenditures (OOP, Food, Non-
food) in Case of Ill Health, for the Poorest Quartile 
Dependent 
Variable OOP Food 
Non-Food 
(excluding OOP) 
Saving 0.183 0.202*** 0.246** 
Borrow 0.588*** 0.043 0.127* 
Sell assets 0.448* 0.026 -0.095 
Family 0.057 -0.064* -0.069 
Labour -0.333 0.034 -0.038 
Consumption -0.419* -0.063 0.002 
Other -0.03 0.025 0.011 
Note: Tables show coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed effects. Models include covariates as explained in 
section 2.2, indicator variables for other shocks and a year dummy. Sample limited to those households ever experiencing a 
health shock, and in the poorest quartile (based on 2002 per capita spending). 
*significant at 10%.  
**significant at 5%.  
***significant at 1%. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 
This paper investigates financial risks of ill health in Indonesia, and the role of informal coping 
mechanisms in consumption smoothing. We find evidence of financial risk from illness through 
OOP health payments across the population, while income from informal wage labor is exposed 
to risk for households in the poorest quartiles and income from self-employed business activities 
for the wealthiest quartile. However, only for the rural population and the poorest quartile do we 
see smoothing to be imperfect and non-food expenditure to be affected by ill health, while the 
wealthiest half of the population seems to be able to protect current spending. 
 
Borrowing appears to be a key coping strategy for the poor to deal with financial risk from ill 
health, which infers potential long-term effects through incurring debt. In addition, future 
income may be affected by depleting buffers such as assets and savings for consumption 
smoothing and financing health care. 
 
Our findings suggest that there is indeed scope for expanding social health insurance to the 
informal sector, as OOP is a key source of financial risk and thereby presumably a barrier to 
seeking health care. This seems to be in line with studies that find utilization of public outpatient 
care by the poorest households in Indonesia to increase through subsidized social health 
insurance (Sparrow, Suryahadi, and Widyanti, 2010) and targeted user fee waivers (Pradhan, 
Saadah, and Sparrow, 2007). 
 
However, the financial risk from income loss for the rural poor falls partly beyond the reach of 
public health care financing reforms as it also points to the need for income insurance. 
Combined with potential long-term effects of subsequent coping strategies, uninsured income 
loss may induce poverty traps. 
 
Most income risk seems to stem from the informal sector that harbors the bulk of the labor 
force from the poorest half of the population, while the formal sector provides financial 
protection from illness not only through health insurance, but also by reducing income risk. The 
policy implications are twofold. Fully protecting households from financial consequences 
following ill health would require a broader social security network that also covers the informal 
sector. In addition, Indonesia needs to move forward with the transformation of its economy 
from an informal to a formal sector dominated economic structure. 
The SMERU Research Institute 12
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
 
Asfaw, Abay, and Joachim von Braun  (2004) ‘Is Consumption Insured against Illness? Evidence 
on Vulnerability of Households to Health Shocks in Rural Ethiopia.’ Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 53 (1): 115–129. 
 
Buntin, Melinda B, and Alan M. Zaslavsky (2004) ‘Too Much Ado about Two-part Models and 
Transformation? Comparing Methods of Modeling Medicare Expenditures.’ Journal of 
Health Economics 23 (3): 525–542. 
 
Erreygers, Guido (2009) ‘Correcting the Concentration Index.’ Journal of Health Economics 28(2): 
521–524. 
 
Gertler, Paul, and Jonathon Gruber (2002) ‘Insuring Consumption against Illness.’ American 
Economic Review 92 (1): 51–70. 
 
Gertler Paul, David Levine, and Enrico Moretti (2009) ‘Do Microfinance Programs Help 
Families Insure Consumption against Illness?’ Health Economics 18 (3): 257–273. 
 
Islam Asadul, and Pushkar Maitra (2012) ‘Health Shocks and Consumption Smoothing in Rural 
Households: Does Microcredit Have a Role to Play?’ Journal of Development Economics 97 
(2): 232–243. 
 
Kochar, Anjini (1995) ‘Explaining Household Vulnerability to Idiosyncratic Income Shocks.’ 
American Economic Review 85 (2):159–164. 
 
Lindelow, Magnus, and Adam Wagstaff (2005) ‘Health Shocks in China: Are the Poor and 
Uninsured Less Protected?’ Policy Research Working Paper 3740, World Bank, 
Washington DC. 
 
Manning, Willard G. and John Mullahy (2001) ‘Estimating Log Models: To Transform or Not to 
Transform?’ Journal of Health Economics 20 (4): 461–494. 
 
Mihaylova, Borislava, Andrew Briggs, Anthony O’Hagan, and Simon Thompson (2011) ‘Review 
of Statistical Methods for Analyzing Health Care Resources and Costs.’ Health Economics 
20 (8): 897–916. 
 
Nguyen, Thi Nhu Nguyet and Eiji Mangyo (2010) ‘Vulnerability of Households to Health 
Shocks: an Indonesian Study.’ Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 46 (2): 213–235. 
 
Pradhan, Menno, Fadiah Saadah, and Robert Sparrow (2007) ‘Did the Health Card Program 
Ensure Access to Medical Care for the Poor during Indonesia’s Economic Crisis?’ World 
Bank Economic Review 21 (1): 125–150. 
 
Santos Silva, Joao MC, and Silvana Tenreyro (2006) ‘The Log of Gravity.’ The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 88 (4): 641–658. 
 
Sparrow, Robert, Asep Suryahadi, and Wenefrida Widyanti (2010) ‘Social Health Insurance for 
the Poor: Targeting and Impact of Indonesia’s Askeskin Program.’ SMERU working 
paper, May 2010. 
The SMERU Research Institute 13
Townsend, Robert M. (1994) ‘Risk and Insurance in Village India.’ Econometrica 62 (3): 539–91. 
 
Wagstaff, Adam (2007) ‘The Economic Consequences of Health Shocks: Evidence from 
Vietnam.’  Journal of Health Economics 26 (1): 82–100. 
 
Wagstaff, Adam, Pierella Paci, and Eddy van Doorslaer (1991) ‘On the Measurement of 
Inequalities in Health.’ Social Science and Medicine 33 (5): 545–557. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
 
The SMERU Research Institute 14
APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A1. Sensitivity to Include Health Financing Programs: Effect of Self-reported Ill 
Health on Per Capita Expenditures (OOP, Food, Non-food) 
Dependent Variable Food 
Non-food 
(excl. OOP) 
OOP 
Including health financing programs    
Ill health 0.012 -0.015 0.974*** 
Social health insurance 0.021 0.009 0.225* 
Targeted fee waiver for the poor 0.021 -0.020 0.056 
Other health insurance 0.055*** 0.025 0.315*** 
Excluding health financing programs    
Ill health 0.011 -0.015 0.974*** 
Note: Table shows coefficients from Poisson models with household fixed effects. Models include covariates as explained in 
section 2.2, indicator variables for other shocks and a year dummy. Other covariates are omitted for convenience. 
*significant at 10%.   
***significant at 1%. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table A2. Descriptive Statistics for Balanced Panel and Attrition Sample 
 Balanced Panel Attrition 
 2002 Std. error 2002 Std. error 
Food spending 155,699 80,948  181,627 103,668 
Non-food spending 100,356 136,701  123,279 162,033 
OOP health spending 6,015 30,834  7,675 48,488 
Household size (persons) 4.03 1.66  3.83 1.83 
Female head of household (1/0) 0.12 0.33  0.17 0.37 
Highest education head of household      
No education (1/0) 0.35 0.48  0.28 0.45 
Primary school (1/0) 0.31 0.46  0.28 0.45 
Junior high school (1/0) 0.12 0.33  0.14 0.35 
Senior high school (1/0) 0.17 0.37  0.23 0.42 
Higher (1/0) 0.05 0.22  0.07 0.26 
Household owns house (1/0) 0.83 0.37  0.70 0.46 
Walls made of bamboo (1/0) 0.14 0.35  0.12 0.32 
House has earth floor (1/0) 0.16 0.37  0.12 0.33 
Total floor area (m2) 68.00 55.55  61.00 58.10 
Access to clean drinking water (1/0) 0.33 0.47  0.43 0.49 
No to private/public water facilities (1/0) 0.14 0.35  0.18 0.38 
House has private toilet (1/0) 0.55 0.50  0.58 0.49 
Closed sewer (1/0) 0.38 0.49  0.47 0.50 
Access to electricity (1/0) 0.85 0.36  0.86 0.35 
Rural (1/0) 0.58 0.49  0.51 0.50 
Number of observations 7,724   1,760  
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Attrition Bias 
 
To assess the threat of attrition bias, we define selection into the 2003–2004 balanced panel by a 
binary indicator sit which we modeled as a function of all control variables (xit) that are included 
in equation (1): 
 
  [ ]01 22 >++= −− itititit uzxs φδ      (2) 
 
We then constructed an inverse Mills ratio (λit) based on probit estimates of equation (2), which 
we included in a difference specification of the consumption smoothing equation: 
 
  ititititit xhy ερλβγ Δ++Δ+Δ=Δ )ln(     (3) 
 
To aid identification, we also included the ID codes of the 2002 enumerators (zit-2) in the 
selection equation, based on the hypothesis that the probability of participating in the following 
survey rounds is partly based on a household’s experience in the first survey. We find that the 
2002 enumerator ID is indeed statistically significant in the selection probit, at 1.6% level. We 
further assume that the enumerator ID in 2002 does not influence the values y in 2003 and 2004. 
 
Under the assumption that uit and Δεit have a joint normal distribution, we estimated the 
smoothing regressions by means of OLS. While the OLS results differ slightly from the FEP 
estimates, they are similar in order of magnitude and statistical significance. The results are 
summarized in Table A3. The coefficients for λ are not statistically significant and the ill health 
effects are robust to including the selection term, which suggests that our results are not prone to 
attrition bias. 
 
 
Table A3. Test for Attrition Bias 
Dependent 
Variable Food 
Non-Food 
(excl. OOP) 
OOP 
Ill health -0.015 -0.015 -0.027 -0.027 0.654*** 0.653*** 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.017] [0.047] [0.047] 
λ  0.003  0.072  0.182 
  [0.034]  [0.045]  [0.127] 
Note: Table shows coefficients from difference regressions for the balanced panel. All models include similar covariates as 
Table 4, with all other covariates omitted from the table for convenience. Standard errors in square brackets. 
***significant at 1%. 
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